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Note
The Right to Be Forgotten
Robert Kirk Walker*
Information posted to the Internet is never truly forgotten. While permanently available
data offers significant social benefits, it also carries substantial risks to a data subject if
personal information is used out of context or in ways that are harmful to the subject’s
reputation. The potential for harm is especially dire when personal information is
disclosed without a subject’s consent. In response to these risks, European policymakers
have proposed legislation recognizing a “right to be forgotten.” This right would provide
persons in European Union countries with a legal mechanism to compel the removal of
their personal data from online databases.
However, only a limited form of the right to be forgotten—a right to delete data that a
user has personally submitted—would be compatible with U.S. constitutional law. By
itself, this limited right is insufficient to address the myriad privacy issues raised by
networked technologies, but it is nevertheless an essential component of a properly
balanced regulatory portfolio—as existing privacy tort law is inadequate in this context.
As such, this Note argues that Congress should recognize this limited right through
adoption of a default contract rule where an implied covenant to delete user-submitted
data upon request is read into website terms of service contracts.

* J.D. Candidate at University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to
thank Professors Calvin R. Massey and Harry G. Prince for their feedback and guidance on this
project.
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Introduction
Imagine: Allison Sprovveduto, a twenty-year-old college student,
travels to Rome to participate in a year-long art history program. She is
joined by a college classmate, Nell Silver, a young photographer who
dreams of becoming a famous artist. In Rome, the women befriend a
ragtag group of expatriate Americans and young European students who
are more interested in contemporary Bacchanalia than in classical
antiquity. Enterprising and ambitious, Nell uses her 35mm camera to
document her new friends’ socially transgressive and pharmacologically
adventurous behavior, which she plans to compile into a book called The
Song of Sensual Freedom, an homage to the work of her favorite
photographer, Nan Goldin. Her friends love the idea and readily agree to
model for her.
Halfway through the year, Allison meets a young Italian, Marco
Canaglia, and they become romantically involved. In a libidinous fog,
Allison and Marco voluntarily pose nude for Nell on several occasions,
including once when they are photographed in flagrante delicto. Sadly,
the relationship ends not long after the picture is taken, and the break-up
is acrimonious.
When the school year ends, Allison and Nell return to the States,
and Nell goes to New York, hoping to find a publisher for her work.
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Though some editors are encouraging, none offers to publish her
photographs. Undeterred, Nell decides to post her pictures online,
hoping that The Song of Sensual Freedom will develop a substantial
following on the Internet and jumpstart her career. Nell posts her
pictures to the Web with imbedded metadata that identifies each subject
by name and includes a descriptive caption (for example, “Allison
Sprovveduto and Marco Canaglia making love, January 30”). However,
Nell does not use any software to prevent users from downloading or
otherwise copying the pictures.
Soon after Nell posts the pictures, Marco visits her website. Still
angry about the break-up, he decides to get back at Allison for ending
their relationship. He copies all the sexually explicit photos of Allison
from Nell’s site, and uploads them to myexgirlfriend.com, a pornographic
website that specializes in “girlfriend revenge” photographs.
Myexgirlfriend.com is part of a network of similar sites that trade
pictures, and soon Allison’s photos show up on adult websites all over
the Internet—she is often identified by name.
A year later, Allison graduates from college and begins looking for
a job in arts education. While putting together her resume, she decides to
query her name in an online search engine. To her horror, the entire first
page of results contains nothing but links to the sexually explicit photos
taken in Italy. Some of the links point to Nell’s website, but most point to
“girlfriend revenge” websites, where users have annotated the photos
with cruel comments about Allison’s physical appearance and her
imagined sexual proclivities.
It is not hard to foresee the potential fallout of this for Allison: lost
job opportunities, strained personal relationships, reputational harm,
damaged mental health, and so on. The above story is exaggerated for
1
dramatic effect, but only slightly. It is quite common for Internet users
2
to reveal personal information they later regret, or to have information
3
posted about them that they wished had remained secret. As numerous
commentators have noted, information posted on the Internet is never
4
5
truly forgotten. On a basic technological level, once personal data enter

1. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Revenge Porn with a Facebook Twist, Forbes (July 6, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/06/revenge-porn-with-a-facebook-twist (discussing defamation
and involuntary nudity on the Internet).
2. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008)
(upholding denial of student’s teacher certification due to picture on student’s MySpace page
captioned “drunken pirate”).
3. See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., No. 1:08 CV 491, 2011 WL 1298180 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2011)
(television anchor brought suit after photos and videos of her taken during “wet t-shirt” contest spread
on the Internet).
4. See, e.g., Charles J. Sykes, The End of Privacy 221 (1999) (“The struggle over privacy is the
preeminent issue of the Information Age.”); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—And
How to Stop It (2008); Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. Times Mag. (July
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the online ecosystem, the original purpose behind disclosure becomes
irrelevant. When allowed to flow freely—unrestrained by private
6
commercial norms or legal dictate—data are open to interpretation and
7
use (or misuse) completely divorced from their original context. Though
8
society benefits from persistent data, there are significant costs imposed
as well—particularly when information disclosed for one specific purpose
9
is ultimately used toward a completely different end. The detrimental
effects of permanently available data are most evident when personal
10
information is disclosed without consent, or when the damage caused by
11
such disclosures is irreparable. Data that cannot be deleted “will forever
tether us to all our past actions, making it impossible, in practice, to
12
escape them.”
What rights of control then, if any, should individuals have over
personal information on the Internet? Should they be able to demand
that information that is harmful to their reputations or that violates their
privacy be permanently removed? If such rights exist, how do they
interact with freedom of expression and the right of the press to gather
13
news, as provided by the First Amendment? How far do privacy rights

21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html.
5. In this Note, the term “personal data” is used to describe not only information that is used to
identify a person (such as her birthdate, address, Social Security number, etc.) but also digital content
that refers to a person, such a photographs or writings by or about her.
6. See Fred H. Cate, Privacy in the Information Age 131 (1997) (“Individual responsibility,
not regulation, is the principal and most effective form of privacy protection in most settings . . . . [T]he
law should only provide limited, basic privacy rights . . . . The purpose of these rights is to facilitate—
not interfere with—the development of private mechanisms and individual choice as a means of
valuing and protecting privacy.”).
7. See generally James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction
of the Information Society (1996); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy,
and the Integrity of Social Life (2010).
8. See, e.g., Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs
of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, Stan. Tech. L. Rev., Dec. 2000, at 1, 7–21
(detailing the many benefits of abundant data).
9. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008)
(personal photo on MySpace resulting in denial of job certification).
10. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 1.
11. For a pre-Internet example of the potential costs of unwanted public exposure, take Oliver
Sipple, the man who thwarted an assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford on September 22,
1975. Unbeknownst to his family in the Midwest, Sipple was homosexual, and he wished for this fact to
be kept secret by the press. Although Sipple entered the public eye only through an act of heroism, the
California Court of Appeal held that there was a legitimate public interest in his private life. Sipple
eventually committed suicide. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that there was a legitimate public interest in Sipple’s private life and that “he did
not make a secret” of his sexual orientation, at least in San Francisco); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 47–48 (2000).
12. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age 125
(2009).
13. See infra Subpart II.C.
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extend temporally (do they ever expire and, if so, under what
circumstances), spatially (in what jurisdictions may they be asserted), and
personally (by and against whom may these rights be asserted)? Finally,
are courts the proper venue for settling such disputes, or are other
14
cultural, technological, or market-based approaches preferable to
adjudication?
15
In response to such questions, European policymakers have called
for the recognition of a “right to be forgotten,” which would provide
individuals with a legal mechanism to compel the permanent removal of
16
their personal information from online databases. The European
Commission (“E.C.”) has defined this right as, “the right of individuals to
have their data . . . deleted when they are no longer needed for legitimate
17
purposes.” While this right has yet to be statutorily adopted, European
data privacy commissioners have indicated that some form of the right
18
will likely be promulgated in the near future.
This Note argues that only a limited form of the “right to be
forgotten” is compatible with U.S. constitutional law. This form—a right
to delete voluntarily submitted data—is substantially more limited in
scope than the right to be forgotten proposed by the E.C. By itself, a
right to delete voluntarily submitted data is insufficient to address the
myriad privacy issues raised by networked technologies. It is, however, a
necessary component of a properly balanced regulatory portfolio, as
existing privacy tort law is inadequate and unconstitutional in this
context.
Part I of this Note demonstrates how current U.S. privacy torts are
both inadequate to deal with the legal issues that a right to be forgotten
seeks to remedy and unconstitutional in light of First Amendment
doctrine. Part II provides a brief historical overview of the theoretical
differences between European and American privacy law, then outlines
the substantive features of the right to be forgotten, as proposed by the

14. See Cate, supra note 6, at 131.
15. See, e.g., Leigh Phillips, EU to Force Social Network Sites to Enhance Privacy, Guardian (Mar.
16, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/mar/16/eu-social-network-sites-privacy (detailing
European Union efforts to protect the “right to be forgotten”).
16. See Press Release from Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission & E.U.
Justice Commissioner, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for
Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Reding, Making Europe
the Standard Setter], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/
12/26 .
17. Eur. Comm’n, A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European
Union, at 8, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter E.U. Personal Data Protection].
18. See Daily Report: Europe Considers a Tough Online Privacy Law, N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/daily-report-europe-considers-a-tough-online-privacy-law;
Graeme McMillan, The Right to Be Forgotten: Europe Proposes New Online-Privacy Laws, Time (Jan. 25,
2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/25/europe-proposes-new-online-privacy-laws/?xid=gonewsedit.
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E.C. Finally, Part III argues that the strongest basis for adopting a
limited form of the right to be forgotten is as an implied contract term.

I. Current U.S. Legal Frameworks Provide Inadequate Data
Privacy Controls
A. Defamation Law and the Right of Privacy
While popular accounts often characterize the legal and policy
19
questions raised by Internet-based technology as unprecedented,
concerns about personal privacy and public reputation have long existed
20
in legal debate. Indeed, privacy and reputational rights are ancient in
21
origin, dating back at least to Roman law. In the Anglo-American
common law tradition, civil and criminal penalties have long been
imposed for making statements that are malicious, false, and disparaging
22
to another person or group. However, recovery for defamation is barred
23
if the statements are true, even if the statements are also extremely
personal, embarrassing, or ruinous to another’s reputation—regardless of
24
the level of malice intended by the speaker. As such, defamation law
provides little shelter for a person’s privacy: The secret and
19. Cf. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Internet Changes Everything—Except Four Things, Harvard
Bus. Rev. Blog Network (May 26, 2011), http://blogs.hbr.org/kanter/2011/05/the-internet-changeseverythin.html.
20. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196–
97 (1890).
21. For example, the Praetorian Edict, codified circa 130 A.D., provided a cause of action for
shouting at a person in public contrary to good morals and for any act that might bring another person
into ill-repute. See S.P. Scott, The Civil Law 315–17 (1932) (translating Corpus Juris Civilis,
§§ 47.10.15.2, 47.10.15.25).
22. See, e.g., Slanderous Reports Act, 1275, 30 Edw. 1, c. 34 (Eng.); A Brief Narrative of the Case
and Tryal of John Peter Zenger, The Historical Society of the Courts of the State of New York
(1734), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/elecbook/zenger_tryal/pg1.htm (establishing
the precedent of truth as an absolute defense to defamation).
23. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that a public official
could win a suit for libel only if he or she could demonstrate “actual malice,” meaning that the
publisher had “knowledge that [the information] was false” or that the information was published with
“reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
56–57 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress caused by a parody
advertisement because the statements made in the advertisement were so ridiculous that they were
clearly not true); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–48 (1974) (holding that if negligence is
present, a showing of actual malice is not necessary for defamation of a private person); Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (extending the actual malice standard to include public figures,
such as those people who “play an influential role in ordering society,” in addition to public officials).
See generally Substantial Truth, Citizen Media Law Project (July 22, 2008),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/substantial-truth.
24. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55 (“‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression, and cannot,
consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages . . . .”).
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uncomfortable facts of one’s life are expressly unprotected by law.
Therefore, an alternative basis is necessary for a successful tort action
against a person making true but harmful statements.
In 1890, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Boston
lawyer Samuel Warren addressed these issues in their classic law review
25
article, The Right to Privacy. Brandeis and Warren argued that a
common law right to privacy exists that “secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
26
and emotions shall be communicated to others.” Brandeis’s and
Warren’s article was written in response to privacy concerns raised by
contemporaneous technological innovations, such as the Kodak Brownie
camera (invented in 1884) and mass-circulation newspapers, which in
27
1890 had a readership of over eight million people. Brandeis and
Warren feared that the “sensationalistic press” would use these new
technologies to upend social norms by “overstepping . . . the obvious
28
bounds of propriety and of decency.” “Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
29
from the house-tops.’” Their proposed remedy was to shield the
30
“thoughts, sentiments, and emotions” of private individuals from
unauthorized public communication through a legal cause of action
31
based on breach of confidence or breach of an implied contract. For
Brandeis particularly, stopping the invasion of private and domestic life
was of utmost public concern; as he later commented, “the right to be let
32
alone . . . [is] the right most valued by civilized men.” However, most
applications in tort law of the principles Warren and Brandeis
championed either have been excised from the body of U.S. law on
constitutional grounds, or have atrophied to the point of feebleness.
B. Privacy Torts
By the middle of the twentieth century, four distinct torts had
developed for violations of privacy: (1) intrusion on seclusion,

25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 193.
26. Id. at 198.
27. See Daniel J. Solove et al., Privacy, Information, and Technology 9–11 (2006).
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 196.
29. Id. at 195.
30. Id. at 198.
31. Id. at 207.
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 20, at 214–15 (“The design of the law must be to protect those persons with
whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and
undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from having
matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will.”).
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(2) misappropriation of name or likeness, (3) publicity placing a person
33
in a false light, and (4) publicity given to private life. The four torts
protect distinct interests: Intrusion on seclusion protects mental wellbeing; misappropriation protects one’s name and image; false light and
34
publication of private facts protect one’s reputation.
Intrusion on seclusion prohibits the collection of information about
35
an individual and protects the areas of a person’s life where they can
36
reasonably expect to avoid intrusion. An intrusion may be by physical
means, such as breaking into a person’s bedroom, or solely through the
37
defendant’s senses, such as peeping through a person’s window.
In contrast, misappropriation of name or likeness is not based on a
physical invasion of private space, but on violation of the “interest of the
38
individual in the exclusive use of his own identity.” This interest is “in
39
the nature of a property right,” and invasion usually occurs when a
person’s name or likeness is used to advertise a product, though the tort
40
is not strictly limited to commercial exploitation.
Disclosing facts about a person that present those facts to the public
in a false light that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” is
41
42
also potentially tortious. The disclosed facts need not be defamatory —
true facts may also shine a false light—but the discloser must have acted
43
with “actual malice” in order for the disclosure to be actionable.
Finally, publicity given to private life (also referred to as public
44
disclosure of a private fact) creates liability for publicizing true facts of a
45
highly personal nature that are not of legitimate concern to the public.
33. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B–E (1977); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif.
L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
34. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B–E; Prosser, supra note 33, at 398–423.
35. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. a.
36. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
37. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b.
38. Id. § 652C cmt. a.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 652C cmt. b. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 311
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see
also 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity § 11 (West 2006).
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E.
42. See, e.g., White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 523–24 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also
77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity § 13.
43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390
(1967); Harris v. City of Seattle, 152 F. App’x 565, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of
Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Ark. 1992) (“[Plaintiff]’s experience
could be likened to that of a person who had been dragged slowly through a pile of untreated
sewage.”).
44. See, e.g., Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988).
45. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D; Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 404 F.3d 504,
508 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,
76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1258–62 (1976) (positing that the “highly offensive to a reasonable person”
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As the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts (published in 1977)
commented, the home life of an actress is of “legitimate and reasonable
46
interest to the public,” but the details of her sex life are not. However,
47
what is of legitimate interest to the public is highly subjective.
While these so-called “Brandeis torts” protect different aspects of
information privacy, common to all is the belief that there is a wall
separating public and private life, and tort law is the mortar holding the
wall together: “American privacy protections, at their metaphoric core,
are the sorts of protections afforded by the walls of one’s home. . . .
[P]rotections become progressively weaker the further the affected
48
person is from home.” The Brandeis torts presume that the public
disclosure of certain categories of information would be, ipso facto,
highly offensive to reasonable people, and that these categories can be
49
judicially ascertained from prevailing social norms.
Broad strokes sketched, let us return to the hypothetical to see
which tort might offer a legal remedy for an embarrassed student who
wishes to enjoin the publication of nude photographs on the Internet. In
this case, intrusion on seclusion is inoperable, as the photographs were
neither acquired through an unauthorized intrusion nor lacked the
subjects’ consent—Allison and Marco were willing participants at the
time their photographs were taken. And, while Nell intended to use the
photographs to benefit her artistic reputation, the subjects are private
citizens, not public figures, and she did not accrue any benefit from their
“reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest, or
50
other values of . . . name or likeness.” Thus, misappropriation of
likeness is also not actionable. While the photos arguably present their
subjects in a bad light, the information contained in the photographs was
true at the time it was acquired, and Nell did not act with malice, actual
or otherwise, toward her subjects. So the only cause of action remaining
is public disclosure of private facts that, as discussed in Part II, is most
likely unconstitutional based on the First Amendment.

element of the tort is conceptually akin to unconscionability); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Calif. L.
Rev. 935, 959 (1968) (“The gravamen in public disclosure [privacy] cases is degrading a person by
laying his life open to public view.”).
46. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h.
47. See Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web That Never Forgets, 9 J. on Telecomm. &
High Tech. L. 345, 349 (2011).
48. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale
L.J. 1151, 1194 (2004).
49. Many scholars, however, find these presumptions dubious. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 47, at
348–49 (“[T]he Brandeis torts failed . . . because they all depend on some social consensus about what
sort of invasions are highly offensive to a reasonable person or outrageous according to existing social
norms.”).
50. 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity § 11 (West 2006). See, e.g., Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 86 (W. Va. 1984).
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C. FLORIDA STAR and the “Obliteration” of the Public Disclosure
Tort
At first blush, the tort of public disclosure of a private fact seems
viable as a remedy to unwanted dissemination of personal information,
but American courts have consistently found that rights of freedom of
speech, particularly those of the press, often trump privacy rights and
51
preclude recovery. When tort injury conflicts with free speech, the latter
must win because, “in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’
52
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”
The desiccation of the tort of public disclosure came under the heat
53
of three Supreme Court cases: Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, Smith v.
54
55
Daily Mail Publishing, and Florida Star v. B.J.F. In Cox Broadcasting,
the Court considered whether the father of a deceased rape victim was
entitled to damages from a broadcast television station that had
identified the victim by name during coverage of her alleged rapist’s
56
57
trial. The Court found for the station. After reviewing the arguments
put forward in The Right to Privacy, as well as the privacy torts contained
58
in the Restatement, the Court concluded that, “even the prevailing law
of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy
fade when the information involved already appears on the public
59
record.” The Court, however, avoided the issue of whether a state could
51. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Winter 1966, at 326, 335–38 (noting a substantial growth in the newsworthiness
exception since The Right of Privacy was published); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First
Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1097, 1101 (1999) (arguing that the privacy
tort has little relevance to law practice today); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 293 (1983) (“[Privacy tort
law] cannot coexist with constitutional protections for freedom of speech and press.”). See generally
David A. Anderson, The Failure of American Privacy Law, in Protecting Privacy 139 (Basil S.
Markesinis ed., 1999). But cf. James Gordley, When Is the Use of Foreign Law Possible? A Hard Case:
The Protection of Privacy in Europe and the United States, 67 La. L. Rev. 1073, 1099–100 (2007)
(arguing that the reluctance of the Supreme Court to delineate public and non-public value in invasion
of privacy cases led to overexpansion of free speech at the expense of legitimate privacy interests).
52. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322
(1988)).
53. 420 U.S. 469, 493–96 (1975) (holding that the state cannot impose liability on a media outlet
for publishing information found in a public record).
54. 443 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1979) (holding that there is no liability for publishing information
lawfully acquired and in the public interest unless state interest is “of the highest order”).
55. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (“[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a
state interest of the highest order . . . .”).
56. Cox, 420 U.S. at 472–74.
57. Id. at 491.
58. See id. at 487–97.
59. Id. at 494–95.
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define certain private activities and information as off-limits from the
press, and instead narrowed its holding to exempt from liability only the
60
truthful publication of names obtained from public court records. Two
years later, in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court ex rel.
Oklahoma County, the Court affirmed Cox Broadcasting and held that a
newspaper company could not be held liable for publishing the events of
a closed-door juvenile proceeding because the sitting judge allowed
61
media into the courtroom.
Then in Daily Mail, the Court suggested in dicta that all truthful
publications made by the press are protected under the First
Amendment, so long as the information was obtained from a lawful
62
source. After reviewing its holdings in Cox Broadcasting, the Court said
that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
63
the highest order.” Finally, in Florida Star, the Court held that “where a
newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly
64
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.” In dissent, Justice White
argued that allowing a state to penalize the publication of truthful
information only when “a state interest of the highest order” was
involved effectively “obliterate[s] one of the most noteworthy legal
inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the publication of private
65
facts.”
Therefore, in light of the Court’s view that the First Amendment
guarantees the media a nearly unlimited right to publish truthful
information, many scholars have questioned whether the tort of public
66
disclosure is still valid:
[T]he tort’s use is limited to cases in which the press publishes
information that was unlawfully obtained and wholly unrelated to a
matter of public significance. . . . Given the narrow class of information

60. Id. at 491.
61. See 430 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1977).
62. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
63. Id.
64. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (emphasis added). The Court cabined this holding
slightly: “We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that
there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion
by the press . . . .” Id.
65. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
66. See Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash,
Georgetown University Center for Transnational Legal Studies Colloquium, May 2009, at 285,
296, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401357 (“After Florida Star, it appears there is little the
states can do to prevent the media from disseminating sensitive information so long as that
information is legally acquired . . . evinc[ing] a clear preference for broad First Amendment
protections of the press over the privacy interests of individuals.”).
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that fulfills the Florida Star requirements, the tort can no longer be an
67
effective tool for protecting individual privacy.

Thus, because of the public disclosure tort’s tenuous constitutional status
68
and the broad range of activities that qualify as protected speech, there
seems little merit to using the tort as a basis for enforcing online privacy
rights.
D. Interlude: Privacy as Intellectual Property
There is a line of scholarly commentary arguing that private
69
information should be treated as a form of intellectual property.
Proponents of this theory argue that individuals should be given the
70
property rights to control their data, and that personally identifiable
information should be treated as “the property or quasi-property of the
71
individual to whom it refers.”
In theory, intellectual property could provide a basis for a right to
be forgotten, and one potential benefit of such a scheme would be that “a
property approach would bind everyone, and not just those who are in
72
contractual privity.” Another potential benefit is that, as a form of
property, private information would be alienable, thus allowing for the
creation of personal data markets where individuals could sell or barter
73
their information.
However, the privacy-as-property model is highly problematic from
a constitutional standpoint. First, “[a] property right is, among other
things, the right to exclude others; an intellectual property right in
information is the right to exclude others from communicating
74
information—a right to stop others from speaking.” As discussed in
Subparts I.B and I.C, the Court has been consistently unwilling to allow

67. Jacqueline R. Rolfs, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of
Public Disclosure, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1107, 1127–28 (1990).
68. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word . . . . [W]e have acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’”).
69. See, e.g., Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84. Geo. L. J. 2381, 2383–84 (1996) (describing personal information as property).
70. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy: Remaking Privacy in Cyberspace, Vand. J.
Ent. L. & Prac., Spring 1999, at 56, 63 (suggesting that if the law gave individuals the rights to control
their data, a new, beneficial market would follow).
71. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1373, 1420 (2000).
72. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1063 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a Price on Their Personal Data,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2012, at B3.
74. Volokh, supra note 72, at 1064–65.
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speech restrictions on truthful publications in the absence of a state
75
interest of the highest order. So far, there have been no cases where
state interests have been found to satisfy this standard. If the Court
disallows recovery in speech-related, non-defamatory tort actions
because of offense to the First Amendment, it is also highly unlikely that
broadly applicable property rights that limit speech would pass
76
constitutional scrutiny.
Second, while quasi-IP rights of publicity afford some privacy
protection, they are not generally applicable to private individuals. For
example, to prevail on a misappropriation of likeness claim the plaintiff
must show that the defendant, “appropriated for his or her own use or
benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public
77
interest, or other values of the person’s name or likeness,” a standard
that is usually met only by celebrities and other well-known persons.
While a privacy-as-property theory does offer marked advantages
78
over a privacy tort theory —for example, it creates a legal entitlement
that could be traded in a private data market—the underlying structure is
not firmly rooted and is unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny on First
79
Amendment grounds. As discussed in Part III, only privacy guarantees
grounded in contract law are capable of surviving First Amendment
scrutiny and providing actionable remedies (albeit limited ones) to data
privacy concerns.

II. Assessing the Right to Be Forgotten as a Remedy to Data
Privacy Lacunae
Current tort laws are insufficient to handle the personal privacy
issues endemic to network-based technologies such as social networks,
search engines, photo- and video-sharing sites, and the Internet
80
generally. To address these lacunae, privacy regulators in Europe have
proposed the legislative recognition of a right to be forgotten that would
allow individuals to demand permanent removal of their personal data
75. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
76. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
77. 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy and Publicity § 11 (West 2006). See, e.g., Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85–86 (W. Va. 1984).
78. See generally Cate, supra note 6, at 19–23 (summarizing various perspectives on privacy);
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2055 (2004); see also Cohen, supra note 71 (expressing
skepticism toward market solutions); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1125, 1127–28 (2000) (advocating for market solutions to privacy issues, rather than new property
rights); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609 (1999)
(arguing for legislative enactment of “fair information practices” to address failures in the “privacy
market”).
79. See Volokh, supra note 72 (arguing that intellectual property rights in privacy are not easily
defensible under free speech doctrine).
80. See supra Subpart I.B.
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from websites. This Part will: (a) contrast the privacy traditions of
Europe and the United States; (b) define the right to be forgotten as it is
currently proposed by the E.C. and analyze the potential impact it would
have on substantive free speech rights; and (c) discuss the First
Amendment issues that the right to be forgotten would encounter if
adopted in the United States.
A. European and U.S. Privacy Traditions
When Americans and Europeans speak of privacy, they are often
talking about very different things. At the most basic level, the
differences come down to conceiving of privacy as an aspect of personal
81
liberty or as a component of personal dignity. In the United States,
where privacy is normally couched in the language of liberty, public
policy is primarily concerned with protecting a citizen’s “reasonable
82
expectations of privacy” against impermissible government intrusion.
For example, American distrust of centralized power is embodied in the
Fourth Amendment, which situates the home as the primary bulwark of
83
privacy, and the government as its primary enemy. In contrast,
European privacy laws are primarily intended to safeguard an
individual’s dignity and public image, rather than to protect against
84
governmental intrusions. This attitude is reflected in Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights, which articulates “the right to
85
respect for . . . private and family life.” Article 8 draws its inspiration
from the French tradition of protecting citizens’ reputations against
86
compromising intrusions by others, particularly the media. Because of
this tradition, European courts tend to be less preoccupied with
protecting free speech rights from government interference than
American courts, and more willing to restrict speech if necessary to
87
88
protect the dignitary rights of citizens. This judicial attitude is almost

81. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 1161.
82. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
83. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 1215.
84. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 11, at 5; Alan F. Westin, Privacy & Freedom (1967); Charles
Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L. J. 475, 477 (1968); Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, Phil. & Pub.
Aff., Winter 1998, at 3.
85. Eur. Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. See Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union arts. 7–8, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) (“Respect for private and
family life,” and “Protection of personal data”).
86. For example, French laws provides a “right to oblivion” (le droit à l’oubli), allowing a
convicted criminal to object to the publication of the facts of her conviction once her sentence has
been served. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 1171–80.
87. In this context, dignitary means “of or relating to one's interest in personal dignity,” Black's
Law Dictionary 522 (9th ed. 2009), rather than the more common usage of dignitary as “one who
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diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court’s view on the scope of free
89
expression in Florida Star.
This is not to say that Americans have no regard for their public
reputation, or that Europeans are not concerned with the powers of the
state, or even that the two concepts are necessarily mutually exclusive.
Rather, privacy policy is best understood as existing on a spectrum
between dignity and liberty, with European authorities drifting toward
the former and American authorities toward the latter. Further, these
default preferences are by no means determinative. For example, the
privacy concerns that inspired The Right of Privacy are largely dignitary
in nature—such as the potential of photographs to invade “the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life,” and the worry that “what is
90
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”
Likewise, Europeans have long championed individual liberties that
many Americans recoil from as grossly undignified, such as public
91
nudity. In the end, the policy differences here amount to more a
question of who should be the protector of private information, not what
92
information should be protected. In Europe, the general trend has been
for the state to intervene to protect citizens’ privacy, whereas in the
United States—in the interest of promoting personal liberty and free
expression—individuals are left to protect their own privacy.
Thus, European rules that protect public reputation through
93
government action would meet significant hurdles in First Amendment
94
doctrine if imported to the United States. Nevertheless, there is a place
possesses exalted rank or holds a position of dignity or honor,” Dignitary Definition, MerriamWebster.com Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dignitary (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
88. See Werro, supra note 66, at 289 (“[I]n the context of a conflict between [privacy rights] and
the freedom of the press, the European Court [of Human Rights] . . . may well consider that in certain
cases privacy rights trump the right to publish.”).
89. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (“[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . . .”); supra Subpart II.C.
90. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 195.
91. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 1200–01 (“Germans in particular appear fully nude in places
like public parks (in the summer) and public coed saunas (in the winter) with a sans-gêne that
Americans can hardly fathom . . . . The difference is not that Europeans refuse to be seen nude, but
that they insist that they want to be the ones who should determine when and under what
circumstances they will be seen nude. The difference is that the decision to appear nude, for
Europeans, belongs to their control of their image.”).
92. See Werro, supra note 66, at 299 (“Europeans trust in the government and distrust the
market, while Americans take precisely the opposite view. . . . [P]rotecting ‘privacy’ in the vocabulary
of both thus demands a shutting off of the flow of information to the institution that the respective
society trusts the least.”). For a comprehensive survey of the difference between privacy traditions in
the United States and Europe, see Whitman, supra note 48.
93. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294.
94. See Werro, supra note 66, at 286 (“The notion that constitutional rights could be balanced
against each other and that the freedom to speak and inform could be balanced against a competing
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for the right to be forgotten in American privacy law, as some operative
features of the right can be separated out from the European legal and
95
cultural context and applied—without offense to the Constitution—
through the mechanism of contracts.
B. Defining the Right to Be Forgotten: The European Commission
Proposal
The right to be forgotten has its intellectual origin in French law,
which provides a “right to oblivion” (le droit à l’oubli), wherein a
convicted criminal may object to the publication of the facts of her
96
conviction once she has served her sentence. Ostensibly, the rationale
for allowing a former convict to block the publication of facts about her
crime is that once a person has been rehabilitated she should be free
from having past criminality taint her reputation. Similarly, in the United
States some states allow for sealing and expunging records of juvenile
offenders on the presumption that youthful infractions should not follow
97
a person into adulthood.
Following this rationale, in 2010 the E.C. issued a communication
proposing a comprehensive approach to personal data protection that
would include a right to be forgotten extending to the personal data of all
98
persons, not just rehabilitated criminals. This right was defined as “the
right of individuals to have their data . . . deleted when they are no longer
99
needed for legitimate purposes.” This definition flows from European
Union Privacy Directive Article 6, which provides that the laws of
member-states must ensure personal information is “kept in a form
which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is
100
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected.” Further,
Article 12 of the Privacy Directive provides that each data subject has
the right to “obtain from the controller . . . erasure or blocking of
101
102
data,” if the use of the data does not comply with Article 6.
constitutional entitlement to the respect of one’s private life does not seem to be an option under
United States constitutional law.”).
95. See generally Zittrain, supra note 4 (arguing for “reputation bankruptcy,” which would allow
people to wipe out certain categories of sensitive information periodically).
96. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 88, 88 (2012), available
at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten.
97. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 781 (West 2011). Information deletion mandates are not
novel. For example, criminal records may be expunged, sealed, or destroyed, and DNA information
taken from witnesses that is no longer necessary is deleted from databases in some states. See MayerSchönberger, supra note 12, at 158.
98. E.U. Personal Data Protection, supra note 17, at 8.
99. Id.
100. Council Directive 95/46, art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
101. Id. at art. 12.
102. This right of data protection is also included in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
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In early 2012, Vivian Reding, the European Commissioner for
Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship, proposed that the
103
European Parliament adopt the right to be forgotten as a European
104
Union-wide regulation. She suggested that, if “an individual no longer
wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a data controller,
and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be
105
removed from their system.” Under the proposed regulation, personal
106
data is broadly defined as “any information relating to a data subject.”
Upon request, website operators are required to “carry out the erasure
without delay” unless the retention of data is “necessary” for exercising
“the right of freedom of expression” as defined by the national laws of
107
E.U. member-states. The regulation also provides an exemption for
“the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic
108
purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression.” Further,
when deletion is requested, a website operator must take “all reasonable
steps” to notify third parties with whom the data have been shared that
109
deletion has been requested. This duty is limited to what is technically
110
feasible and does not require “a disproportionate effort.” Failure to
comply with the regulation by any data controller could result in fines up
to one million euros or two percent of the operator’s annual worldwide
111
income.
Not surprisingly, heated scholarly debate followed the
Commission’s announcement. Most commentators focused on the
112
proposal’s potential chilling effects on free speech and the economic
the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 16(1), Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/47). See generally Jef Ausloos, The ‘Right to Be
Forgotten’—Worth Remembering?, 28 Computer L. & Sec. Rev 143 (2012).
103. See Reding, Making Europe the Standard Setter, supra note 16. For a thorough analysis of the
proposed data protection legislation, see Christopher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed
Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, Privacy &
Sec. L. Rep. (Feb. 6, 2012), and Somini Sengupta, Europe Weighs Tough Law on Online Privacy, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 2012, at B1.
104. In E.U. law, a directive requires member-states to adopt its requirements into national law,
whereas a regulation applies throughout the European Union without need for ratification by the
member-states. See Treaty of Rome art. 249, Mar. 25, 1957, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/
treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html (“[T]he European Parliament acting jointly with
the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take
decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.”).
105. Reding, Making Europe the Standard Setter, supra note 16, at 5.
106. Eur. Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, at
art. 4(2), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
107. Id. art. 17(3).
108. Id. art. 80(1).
109. Id. art. 17(2).
110. Id. art. 13; see also Kuner, supra note 103.
111. Commission Proposal, supra note 106, at arts. 79(5)(c), (6)(c).
112. See, e.g., Matt Warman, EU ‘Asking Google to Censor Web,’ Telegraph (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:00
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/9081619/EU-asking-Google-to-censor-web.html;
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113

impact of compliance. It remains to be seen what parts of the proposal,
114
and whether the
if any, the European Parliament will enact
115
promulgated regulations will be enforced as written. If it were enacted
without alteration, the proposal represents the strongest version of the
right to be forgotten currently under consideration by European
policymakers.
Based on the Commission Proposal, a working definition of the
right to be forgotten has two parts: (1) An individual has the right to
have her personal data deleted from a website if doing so does not
infringe free expression (which explicitly includes journalism and artistic
and literary expressions); and (2) website operators must remove such
data from their servers without delay, in addition to making best efforts
to remove it from any third-party servers with which the data has been
shared.
C. Does the Right to Be Forgotten Violate the First Amendment?
“The American resistance to [privacy rights] has always been a
resistance founded on two values in particular: the value of the free
116
press, and the value of the free market.” This has been particularly true
when privacy rights interfere with newsgathering. In the United States,
the media is expected to “uncover the truth and report it—not merely
the truth about government and public affairs, but the truth about
117
people.” The law protects these expectations, and “when they collide
118
with expectations of privacy, privacy almost always loses.” Thus, some
scholars have predicted that if the right to be forgotten were adopted in
the United States, it would fare no better under constitutional scrutiny
119
than the Brandeis torts have.

Jane Yakowitz, More Bad Ideas from the E.U., Forbes (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:57PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2012/01/25/more-bad-ideas-from-the-e-u.
113. See, e.g., Privacy Laws: Private Data, Public Rules, Economist, Jan. 28, 2012, at 47.
114. See Kuner, supra note 103 (“Completion of the EU legislative process is a politically charged
undertaking that will likely take at least one to two years to complete, and will require approval by the
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament; the Proposed Regulation is to take
effect two years after that. This lengthy process also makes it practically certain that there will be
changes (potentially major ones) to the Proposal.”).
115. See Rosen, supra note 96, at 92 (“Europeans have a long tradition of declaring abstract
privacy rights in theory that they fail to enforce in practice.”); see also Kuner, supra note 103 (“Article
17 will likely prove difficult to apply in practice, and may have a chilling effect on use of the internet in
the EU.”).
116. Whitman, supra note 48, at 1208.
117. Id. at 1197.
118. Id.; See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540–41 (1989).
119. See Werro, supra note 66, at 298 (“[T]here is no reason to think that a right to be forgotten
stands any chance of developing under the current Cox and Florida Star regime in American privacy
law.”).
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This may not be the case. Consider the three primary groups of
actors who are implicated by the right to be forgotten: data subjects,
content creators, and third-party websites like search engines and
120
aggregators. The first group covers people who are the subjects of data
posted, stored, or collected online. The second group contains persons
who post data online that qualifies as protected speech, such as blog
posts, pictures on Facebook, videos on YouTube, product comments in
online stores, et cetera. The third category comprises websites that
display or link to material created by others (for example, news feeds,
121
search engines, audiovisual databases). In the interaction between
these three groups, the salient question is whether granting data subjects
the right to compel the removal of personal information from the
Internet would infringe upon the First Amendment rights of either
122
Or, in terms of the
content creators or third-party websites.
hypothetical: (1) Would granting Allison, a data subject, the right to
require that Nell, a creator, remove the offending pictures from her
website violate Nell’s free speech rights; and (2) would granting this right
allow Allison to compel that the pictures be removed from third-party
websites, such as myexgirlfriend.com?
Turning to the first question, photography is a form of expressive
123
conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, Nell
120. The term “content aggregator” is being used here to denote passive compilers of data who use
automated processes (for example, search engine algorithms) rather than manual selection to populate
their databases. While many sites both aggregate and create data, those that actively create, edit, or
publish original content would fall in the creator category in this taxonomy, rather than in the content
aggregator category. Therefore, journalistic websites such as online newspapers, magazines, blogs, et
cetera are creators, even if their First Amendment rights differ from those enjoyed by private
individuals. While these differences are not insignificant from the standpoint of First Amendment
doctrine, they do not affect our analysis here. See Chris Conley, The Right to Delete, ACLU of
Northern California 53, 56 (last modified Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.aaai.org/ocs/
index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1158 (“[A] right to delete may have additional impact on freedom of
the press, in the sense that a right to delete incriminating records from one’s past reduces or eliminates
the press’s ability to (re)publish these incidents if they return to relevance.”).
121. This taxonomy is derived, in part, from questions posed by Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy
Counsel for Google. See Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion,
Privacy . . . ? (Mar. 9, 2011), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-tooblivion.html (arguing that a “right to be forgotten” is a concealed form of censorship).
122. See Conley, supra note 120, at 54–57.
123. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word. . . . [W]e have acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’”).
Similarly, the fact that photographs are sexually explicit does not preclude them protection under the
First Amendment. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by First Amendment . . . .”); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973) (“Today we would add a new three-pronged test [for obscenity]:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether
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has a constitutional right to make photographs and to display her work in
public fora such as her website. However, sexually explicit pictures also
convey information related to the people photographed, and so the
pictures fall within the scope of data that are subject to the Commission
Proposal’s right to be forgotten: “any information relating to a data
124
subject.” So, Nell’s free speech rights stand in direct opposition to
Allison’s putative right to be forgotten. However, as discussed in Subpart
II.B, the Commission Proposal also provides that data may not be
deleted when it is necessary for exercising “the right of freedom of
125
expression,” as defined by national laws. Under Daily Mail and Florida
126
Star, truthful publications of lawfully obtained information may be
constrained only when the restriction is “narrowly tailored to a state
127
interest of the highest order.”
While truthful publications are not automatically afforded First
128
Amendment protection, there have been no cases where the Court has
found an individual’s privacy rights are themselves a “state interest of
highest order.” Furthermore, given that the Florida Star Court held that
a newspaper could not be constrained from publishing the full name of a
129
sexual assault victim, it is all but inconceivable that a court would find
that the privacy rights of a willful sexual actor who subsequently
regretted her decisions are of sufficient state interest to justify a restraint
on speech: “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests
130
alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech.” Therefore,
Allison would not have grounds to compel the removal of the
photographs from Nell’s website based on the right to be forgotten, as
131
doing so would violate Nell’s First Amendment rights. Thus, by

the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124. See Commission Proposal, supra note 106, art. 4(2).
125. Id. art. 17(3)(a).
126. It remains an open question whether liability would arise from the publication of truthful
information that was obtained by illegal means. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528, 534 (2001).
The First Amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighs privacy rights if
the media outlet plays no part in illegal interception. Id. at 534. “However, [the Pentagon Papers case]
raised, but did not resolve, the question ‘whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful
acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.’” Id. at 528 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F. 491 U.S. 524,
535, n.8 (1989)).
127. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979).
128. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (“We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically
constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may
protect the individual from intrusion by the press . . . .”).
129. Id. at 537–41.
130. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 634 (1990).
131. See supra Subpart II.C.
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extension, it seems that the right to be forgotten could only be applied by
a data subject against a content creator under “exceptional
circumstances” of the “highest order” of state interest. Personal privacy
and reputational harm are not such interests.
Similarly, the First Amendment would preclude Allison from
compelling the removal of the photographs from third party websites,
including myexgirlfriend.com. Even though Marco acquired the
photographs through illicit means (that is, by copying Nell’s copyrighted
images without authorization), Nell lawfully created the original
photographs. Unlike Nell, Allison does not have any proprietary
132
interests in the photographs, and she cannot compel Nell to enforce her
copyrights against third-party infringers. Likewise, if there is no basis for
a data subject to assert the right to be forgotten against a content
133
creator, then there is also no basis for a claim against third parties who
134
copy, link to, or otherwise republish the offending data. Given the
breadth of First Amendment protections following Florida Star, the
speech rights of creators and third-party websites trump the privacy
rights of data subjects. Thus, without Nell’s assistance, Allison has no
constitutionally valid means to compel websites displaying the
photographs to remove them.
However, even though applying the full weight of the right to be
forgotten would be unconstitutional, the First Amendment does not
proscribe all potential data deletion rights. The First Amendment not
only grants Internet users a right to speak, but also the right not to speak.
“The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual
135
freedom of mind.’” Moreover, the First Amendment does not compel
136
anyone to speak, nor does it forbid voluntary agreements not to
137
speak. Therefore, just as Nell may exercise her right to free expression

132. The situation might be different if Allison was a well-known person, in which case a state
right-of-publicity tort might be applicable.
133. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
134. See id.
135. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). See Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment Right of Silence (Wayne State Univ.
Law School Research Paper Series, No. 07-39, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031505.
136. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (“[The First
Amendment contains a] freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645
(1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the
Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all . . . .”); see also Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, the Right Not to Speak and
the Problem of Government Access Statutes, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1001, 1012–19 (1999).
137. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991) (holding that contracts not to speak are
enforceable without First Amendment problems); cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(First Amendment case law does not command the press to publish what it would rather withhold).
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by posting photographs on her website, she also has a right to stop
speaking by removing the pictures, thereby muting the instrument of her
speech. Similarly, nothing in the First Amendment forbids Nell from
entering into a contract with her website hosting company where she
could mandate that data she posts be permanently removed from their
servers upon request. In instances where a user submits her own personal
data to a website and then demands removal, both actions are variations
on the same underlying constitutional right. As such, a circumscribed
version of the right to be forgotten—a right to delete voluntarily
submitted data—would not offend the First Amendment.

III. The Contractual Basis for a Right to Delete Voluntarily
Submitted Data
Establishing a statutory right to delete voluntarily submitted data
would help fulfill user’s expectations of data privacy, align international
privacy norms, and drive the market for improved data management
technologies. Furthermore, such a right could be legislatively enacted as
138
a default contract rule without running afoul of the U.S. Constitution.
The main advantage of contracting for privacy is that the contract
model does not endorse any right to stop others from speaking that
would offend the First Amendment. Rather, it endorses a right to stop
139
people from breaking their promises. In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the
Supreme Court held that contracts not to speak—that is, promises made
not to reveal information or say certain things—are enforceable and do
140
not violate the First Amendment. Similarly, when persons have an
expectation that their private data will be kept secret, then courts may
141
infer an implied contract of confidentiality or apply the doctrine of
142
promissory estoppel to enforce this expectation of privacy. “In many

138. See Volokh, supra note 72, at 1051 (“While privacy protection secured by contract is
constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free
speech law.”). But cf. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1283, 1308–12 (2000) (arguing for tort action against unauthorized disclosure of personal data based
on “breach of trust”).
139. Volokh, supra note 72, at 1061.
140. See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 670–72. This holding also applies to promises that are
enforceable under the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel and to implied contracts.
141. Implied terms in contracts come in two flavors. First, implied terms may be derived from
judicial precedent or statute (for example, under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306(1), a term of
best efforts is implied in exclusive dealings contracts). Such terms are referred to as implied-in-law.
Terms that are inferred based on the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, such as
prior transactions between the parties, industry custom, specific definition of other contractual terms,
etc., are referred to as implied-in-fact. For our purposes, a right to delete voluntarily submitted data
could be read into a contract in either form without altering the substantive right granted.
142. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. a (1979); Volokh, supra note 72, at 1058–
59; Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the Global
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contexts, people reasonably expect—because of custom, course of
dealing with the other party, or all the other factors that are relevant to
finding an implied contract—that part of what their contracting partner is
143
promising is confidentiality.” As such, the enforcement of privacy
contracts does not offend free speech rights, as the government is not
restricting speech, but rather enforcing obligations that the would-be
144
speaker has voluntarily assumed.
Privacy contracts also avoid the need for courts to determine
145
whether disclosures are “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” as
146
required by the Brandeis torts. Rather, privacy contracts rely on a
more objective, purpose-limitation principle whereby “the recipient of
personal information can only use that information for the purposes to
147
which [the discloser] consented, and no[t] others.” Courts regularly
look to usage in trade, course of dealings, standard business practices
within an industry, et cetera to interpret implied-in-fact terms in
commercial contracts. If Congress enacted legislation requiring implied
privacy terms in website terms of service contracts, these same
interpretative and evidentiary principles could be used to assess a
person’s expectations of data privacy at the time of initial disclosure.
Framing privacy rights in contractual terms also has the benefit of
increasing data privacy protections across the Internet by standardizing
website terms of service agreements and privacy policies. Currently,
website privacy policies vary dramatically, even within a network of sites
148
operated by a single company. Policies are also subject to change—
Information Economy, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 751, 768 (1999) (book review) (“[P]olls show that many
people who disclose to others information about themselves for a particular purpose (e.g., to get credit
or to be treated for a disease) believe that their disclosures have been made under an implied, if not an
explicit, pledge to use the data only for that purpose.”).
143. Volokh, supra note 72, at 1057–58 (footnote omitted).
144. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 78, at 1155–57 (arguing that nonconsensual communication of
personal data by merchants should be actionable under a quasi-trade-secret theory, supported by
Cohen v. Cowles Media); see also Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 671. See generally Scott Shorr, Note,
Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80
Cornell L. Rev. 1756 (1995).
145. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977); supra Subpart I.B.
146. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 47, at 348–49 (“[T]he Brandeis torts failed . . . because they all
depend on some social consensus about what sort of invasions are highly offensive to a reasonable
person or outrageous according to existing social norms.”).
147. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 12, at 136. See Daniel J. Solove, The Future of
Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet 174–76 (2007) (arguing for an expansion
of breach of confidence laws to include embarrassing posts by others in violation of one’s privacy
settings); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 130–32 (2007).
148. For example, prior to consolidation into one single privacy policy on March 1, 2012, Google
had sixty separate privacy policies for its various websites and services, each with its own set of terms
and conditions, some of which were mutually exclusive and contradictory. See Policies & Principles,
Google, available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see also Claire
Cain Miller, Google to Update Privacy Policy to Cover Wider Data Use, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Jan.
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149

often suddenly—at the sole discretion of website operators. Further,
the software architecture of many websites incorporates data-gathering
150
technologies provided by third parties, such as advertising networks,
that collect information about users either on behalf of the host website
or for their own business purposes. For example, according to a Wall
Street Journal investigative report, “the nation’s 50 top websites on
average installed 64 pieces of tracking technology onto the computers of
151
visitors, usually with no warning.” Certain types of data collection are
152
subject to statutory restriction, such as financial data, healthcare
153
154
information, and information collected about children. But most
personal data collected and stored by website operators (for example, a
user’s geographic location, web search and browsing history, personal
messages and information shared on social media sites, and files stored
155
“in the cloud”) are not currently subject to regulation.
Additionally, personal data collection and retention practices are
also largely out of sync with public perception of what data privacy rights
156
should exist. For example, a 2009 survey by the Universities of
Pennsylvania and California found that more than 80% of Americans
believe websites should not track their behavior for advertising, and that
more than 90% believe advertisers should be required by law to stop
157
tracking on request. A follow-up study in 2010 found that 88% of
158
young adults surveyed said that the law should require websites to

24, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/google-to-update-its-privacy-policies-andterms-of-service.
149. See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Do Facebook’s New Privacy Settings Let It off the Hook?,
CNET News (May 26, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20006054-36.html; Jon
Swartz, Facebook Draws Protests on Privacy Issue, USA Today (May 13, 2010, 9:31 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2010-05-14-facebook14_ST_N.htm; Jessica E. Vascellaro,
Facebook Grapples with Privacy Issues, Wall St. J. (May 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704912004575252723109845974.html.
150. See Advertising Network, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
151. Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, Wall St. J. (July 30, 2010, 5:59 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404.html.
152. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 248, 377, 1831, 1848, 2908 (2006); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80 (2006); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
153. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2006), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1320, 1395 (2006).
154. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).
155. Some scholars have argued that this lack of regulation is preferable from both a market and
public policy perspective. See Cate, supra note 6, at 131.
156. See, e.g., Lothar Determann, Data Privacy in the Cloud: A Dozen Myths and Facts, Computer
& Internet Lawyer, Nov. 2011, at 1, 2–3.
157. Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans Reject Tailored
Advertising 14, 23, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214.
158. Those surveyed were aged 18 to 24.
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159

delete all stored information about users, and 62% said there should be
a law giving people the right to know all the information that a website
160
has collected about them. The authors of these surveys found that,
“large percentages of young adults are in harmony with older Americans
161
when it comes to sensitivity about online privacy.” These empirical
results indicate a broad cultural preference for having the ability to optout of data collection and to have personal data removed on demand.
The existence of cultural preferences concerning online privacy does
not necessarily imply that a user would expect these preferences to be
reflected in a website terms of service agreement: Users may wish one
thing, but expect or even accept its opposite. However, just because users
might not currently expect contractual data privacy, this does not present
a barrier against a legislature requiring that an implied data deletion
term be included in all website terms of service contracts. Indeed, such
legislative action is likely necessary for data retention practices to ever
come into line with popular preferences, as website operators have
relatively weak incentives to do so on their own. For example, data
162
storage is increasingly inexpensive, and website operators benefit
financially from retaining data for future use—such as selling their
databases to other companies or “mining” them for the purposes of
163
targeted advertising or marketing. Moreover, website operators are
164
often slow to enforce their own privacy procedures. While websites
that publicly violate user privacy norms risk reputational damage and
loss of goodwill to their corporate brands, so long as all operators
maintain similarly weak data privacy and protection standards, the
165
headline sensitivity for any individual company is minimized. Thus
establishing an explicit legal basis for users to demand the deletion of
data, accompanied by strong penalties for non-compliance, would act as

159. See Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults
When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 11 tbl.5 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864.
160. Id. at 11 tbl.4; see also Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick, Social Privacy in Networked Publics:
Teen’s Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies (June 2, 2011) (Privacy Law Scholar’s Conference working
paper).
161. Hoofnagle, supra note 159, at 3.
162. See FTC, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations
for Businesses and Policymakers 46–47 (2010) [hereinafter FTC Staff Report].
163. See Angwin, supra 151; see also FTC Staff Report, supra note 162, at 36–52.
164. See, e.g., Nick Clayton, ‘Deleted’ Facebook Photos Still Online After Three Years, Wall St. J.
(Feb. 7, 2012, 7:13 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2012/02/07/deleted-facebook-photos-stillonline-after-three-years.
165. This, in many respects, is an example of the economic public goods problem, where society as
a whole would benefit from the creation of a good or service (for example, a lighthouse), but no
individual actor has incentive to create this good because of the disproportionate burden of doing so
relative to the individual benefit.
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a market lever to pressure website operators into adopting deletion
166
protocols that better align with users’ professed preferences.
The contract approach to data privacy, however, is not without
significant limitations. First, and most restrictive, are the requirements of
contractual privity. While “many jurisdictions around the world
conceptualize information privacy rights as binding all subsequent users
167
of an individual’s personal information,” in the United States only
parties in privity to the contract have standing to enforce it. Third party
beneficiaries (persons who receive some legal entitlement flowing from a
contract) may have standing to sue to enforce the agreement or recover
168
for its breach. Other parties do not. Thus, a person who suffered the
exposure of embarrassing personal data she did not personally disclose
would not have standing for a breach of contract action against the
website hosting the offending content as she is not in privity with the
169
website nor does she benefit from the terms of service contract. As
such, contracts can only protect personal data that are voluntarily
submitted by a user to a website with whom she has a contract (explicit
or implied), and a third party cannot compel the deletion of
embarrassing data submitted by another person.
Applying this to our hypothetical, Allison would not have standing
to force myexgirlfriend.com to remove the photos of her based on breach
170
of contract, and likewise neither would Nell. Only Marco, the villain of
our story, is in contractual privity with myexgirlfriend.com, and only he
could compel deletion of the photographs. Thus, a right to delete
voluntarily submitted data does not provide a surrogate cause of action
for the public disclosure tort and is quite limited in the relief it could
provide to victims of public humiliation.
That said, a large portion of data uploaded to websites is done by
users in privity with the website. For example, users that post comments
on their Facebook walls, submit videos to YouTube, or send out
messages on Twitter would all be in privity with these respective
websites. In such cases, if the terms of service contract between the user
and the websites included an implied right to remove voluntarily

166. See Commission Proposal, supra note 106, arts. 79(5)(c), (6)(c) (failure to comply with the
regulation by any data controller could result in fines up to one million euros or two percent of the
operator’s annual worldwide income).
167. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 12, at 136.
168. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981).
169. See Volokh, supra note 72, at 1061 (“Contract law protection . . . . only lets people restrict
speech by parties with whom they have a speech-restricting contract, express or implied.”).
170. However, a lack of contractual privity would not preclude Nell from pursuing a copyright
infringement action against either Marco, myexgirlfriend.com, or any other website that displayed her
work without permission.
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submitted data, then users would have a viable cause of action against
the website operator if the data were not deleted upon request.
However, while an implied covenant requiring data deletion may be
read into an agreement between users and website operators, this
covenant can be explicitly waived by the parties. Since data privacy
contracts are premised on the parties’ right not to speak, the government
cannot mandate that an implied data deletion right is not waivable, as
171
doing so would be state action in violation of the First Amendment. As
the Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media noted, “[t]he parties themselves . . .
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions that
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self172
imposed.” Thus, while the government may say that Internet terms of
service contracts must carry an implied promise that the seller will
remove user-submitted data on request, it may not add that this term
may not be waived.
The vast majority of website terms of service agreements are “clickwrap” adhesion contracts, and users must accept all the terms offered by
the website operator as a condition of using the site—users have no
173
bargaining power to negotiate these terms. Thus, for a website operator
to require waiver as a condition of use would eviscerate the user’s
174
implied rights of data deletion. “If the right to delete can be waived
simply by agreeing to a Web site’s Terms of Service, it is likely to have no
175
Therefore, even though the
practical effect whatsoever . . . .”
government cannot compel website operators to accept a non-waivable
right to delete terms, it can require specific, explicit, and informed
consent as a precondition to waiver. Further, the government could also
provide statutory and extra-legal incentives for companies to voluntarily
adopt right to delete terms, such as tax subsidies, safe harbors from
176
vicarious liability, and positive publicity for companies that adopt
deletion protocols.
To give data deletion rights weight, statutory damages for the
breach of an implied-in-fact data deletion term would need to be
171. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670–71 (1991); see also Volokh, supra note 72, at
1061–62.
172. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 671.
173. An adhesion contract is “a standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by
another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice
about the terms.” Black's Law Dictionary 366 (9th ed. 2009). A “click-wrap” or “point and click”
agreement is a form of adhesion contract where a computer user assents to the terms of the agreement
by clicking a button or ticking a box on a website or other electronic interface.
174. And this would also likely violate the Constitution on First Amendment grounds, as data
deletion rights are a sub-species of free speech rights. See supra Subpart II.C.
175. Conley, supra note 120, at 56.
176. This is similar to those incentives provided to “interactive computer services” and Internet
“service providers” under the Communications Decency Act, see 47 U.S.C. § 230, or the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 512, respectively.
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adopted, as providing appropriate relief to aggrieved data subjects would
177
likely prove problematic under common law principles. In general,
contract law allows for equitable remedies such as specific performance
(here, the deletion of the offending data) only if a court finds monetary
178
Likewise, punitive damages are not
damages are not adequate.
179
available for breach of a contract, as they are in tort. Therefore,
specific statutory remedies would be required in the form of
(a) substantial monetary damages for companies that failed to maintain
sufficient data privacy and deletion protocols, and (b) obligatory specific
performance of the data deletion term. Also, provisions allowing for the
recovery of a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs would likely
be necessary in order to encourage enforcement of the implied term
through litigation.
Finally, additional legislation would be necessary to facilitate prefiling discovery, as potential plaintiffs currently have no way of knowing
whether offending data has actually been removed from defendants’
180
servers. “Possible measures could include shifting the burden of proof
from individuals to the information processor, letting criminal rather
than civil courts take on enforcement, or lowering court costs to
181
encourage individuals to litigate their information privacy claims.”

Conclusion
Surprisingly, in the end we come around full circle to The Right of
182
Privacy. There, Warren and Brandeis proposed two legal remedies for
an invasion of privacy: one based on a breach of confidence, the other on
183
a breach of an implied contract. While the public disclosure tort that
grew out of the former strain has withered away from lack of
184
constitutional nourishment, the implied contract branch remains a
verdant source for privacy law. As discussed in Part III above,
formulating data privacy in terms of implied contractual rights avoids

177. Though the damages it proposed were unrealistically high, as discussed in Subpart II.B., the
Commission Proposal may offer some valuable guidance here nevertheless. See Commission Proposal,
supra note 106, at arts. 79(5)(c), (6)(c).
178. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (1981) (“Specific performance or an
injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the
injured party.”).
179. See id. § 355 (“Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”).
180. See, e.g., Clayton, supra 164.
181. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 12, at 139. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, art. 23, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 45 (EC).
182. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 211.
183. Id.
184. See supra Subpart I.C.
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offending the First Amendment and offers a viable (albeit partial)
solution to the concerns that the right to be forgotten attempts to
address. While the full measure of the E.C.’s proposal is incompatible
185
with American constitutional and common law principles, a right to
delete voluntarily submitted data is legally cognizable.
186
Legislatively adopting such a right would serve several important
public policy goals. First, it would better align corporate data protection
187
practices with users’ privacy expectations. Second, it would provide
clear guidance to website operators as to what data protocols are legally
required, which would allow for more efficient business planning and
technology investment. Third, prescribing statutory penalties for failing
to comply with these standards would provide a powerful incentive to
develop more secure data management technologies and to honor user
188
deletion requests in a timely manner. Fourth, a statutory right of data
deletion would potentially help to harmonize data protection policies in
the United States and Europe and could possibly forestall the adoption
of the more constitutionally troubling aspects of the Committee
189
Proposal. Finally, explicit statutory rights of data privacy would
190
engender greater trust in the marketplace for personal data, allowing
individuals to disclose personal data without fear that it will be misused.
Many, if not most, people assume that there are zones of privacy in
their lives that are not open for public inspection. In many respects, the
default position in the non-digital world is privacy or anonymity, insofar
as a person has to take positive steps to be noticed by a larger public. But
on much of the Internet, the opposite is true: The default is for personal
data to be readily available, and it is only through intentional action that
privacy is achieved. Universal access is one of the great virtues of the
Internet, but it becomes problematic when people erroneously assume
that they have greater privacy online than they actually do. Thus, while
there are real risks to free speech implicit in a far-reaching right to be
forgotten, the animating spirit of the proposed right—that “[i]f an
individual no longer wants his personal data to be . . . stored by a data

185. See supra Part II.
186. Under Congress’ interstate commerce power. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
187. See generally Hoofnagle, supra 159.
188. While statutory penalties are arguably necessary to ensure compliance by website operators,
the amounts stipulated in the Commission Proposal—up to one million euros or two percent of the
operator’s annual worldwide income—are too high to be realistically enforceable. See Commission
Proposal, supra note 106, arts. 79(5)(c), (6)(c). Further, overly punitive penalties are likely to chill
innovation rather than encourage it, as companies will likely become overly cautious in their approach
to data management and shy away from developing new technologies, for fear of incurring the
regulators’ wrath.
189. See, e.g., Rick Mitchell, Paris Court Says Google Violated ‘Right to Forget’ of Ex-Porn Actress,
Elec. Com. & L. Rep. (Mar. 23, 2012).
190. Cf. Litman, supra 138, at 1301–11.
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controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data
191
should be removed” —is worthy of consideration by U.S. legislators and
jurists.

191. Reding, Making Europe the Standard Setter, supra note 16.

